What of an Israel for all its citizens?

2/05/2010

Larry Stillman

In recent years, Israeli groups have put forward several constitutions for the state of Israel. However, these proposals are distinguished by their lack of conformity to democratic principles, in particular the right to complete equality of all residents and citizens, and by their treatment of Arab citizens as if they were strangers in this land, where history, memory and collective rights exist only for Jewish people. It is no coincidence therefore that these proposals have been preoccupied with the question of, “Who is a Jew?” and have neglected the primary constitutional question of, “Who is a citizen?”

From the preface to the ‘Democratic Constitution’, the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel proposed by Adalah, 2007 [ http://www.adalah.org/eng/index.php].

The position taken by Adalah, the Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel intrigues me, because it argued for the transformation of Israel (within 1967 borders). Adalah is an organization that has been funded by the New Israel Fund and the fact that it has produced such a document has been used to bash the NIF. However, I hope that responses can stick to the Adalah proposal, rather than re-hashing issues with the NIF. The proposal comes from sober-minded, well-educated, middle class Palestinian Israelis—a break from the stereotypes that many have about Palestinians.

Thus, to reject Adalah’s proposal and to say that it is a cover for a ‘Greater Arab State of Palestine’, endangering Jews, or naïve ultra leftist solutions for ‘secular democratic Palestine), is a simplistic rhetorical scare ignoring the very sober nature of the proposal about the nature of citizenship in a country for all its citizens, built around the ideas derived from “distributive justice” rather than specific ethnic rights. The proposal is thus far from a call for a dhimmi (traditional, second-class) status for Jews in an Arab country but it also confronts the notion of the special (legal) Jewish character of Israel, preferring a constitution in which all communities are equal in a legal sense. It can be seen as an important positional document for a practical way forward. I interpret the document as supporting a ‘two state’ solution, though others, in the current environment, may see it as a ‘one state’ answer. I am more focussed in this article on ‘Israel’ than whether there are one or two states.

The phenomenon of Jewish exceptionalism which has driven much of Zionist ideology—that Jewish history (and religiously determined entitlement)—are experientially different to anything else any group has experienced, should not block future paths to negotiating down a new path if it results in security for the Jewish community in Israel, rather than an ideology of ‘self-determination’ which has always come up against Arab opposition. There will need to be a fundamental realignment of Zionist ideology towards ‘a state for all’ inspired by Jewish history and sense of destiny, but no longer welded to a state that is equal for some, and not for all.

It is interesting that a number of Israelis on the left including Meron Benvenisti in a recent Haaretz essay, and now Yehuda Shenhav in a new book (not yet in English), have been suggesting similar proposals for a new, democratic state to break the current impasse, though these seen as highly controversial, being tagged as anti-Zionist, a form of suicide and so on, but it is clear that the issue is going to re-enter the discussion-sphere in Israel, as it has abroad. I also understand that even some in the settler movement are considering the possibility of citizenship in a Palestine as a quid pro quo for continuing settlements. Such is the problem that the Reut Institute with close links to the Israeli government, has been proposing a controversial destablization campaign against Israeli and other Jewish intellectual “delegitimizers” who support such ideas.

Adalah, as with other Palestinians, sees no justice to the fact that the actual rights of Arab/Palestinian Israelis are for all practical purposes, like those in the pre-civil rights USA for African Americans, theoretically equal but practically, separate and unequal. Despite the many exceptions, e.g. members of the Knesset, Israeli Palestinians do not get their civil or taxpayer’s worth of benefits (see http://www.acri.org.il/eng/) and legal discrimination is endemic.

Notwithstanding arguments over legal philosophy, the proposal also needs to be taken seriously for other, practical reasons:

Arabs within the 1967 boundaries constitute at least 20% of the population with a rapid rate of natural increase. Of course, Israel has the option of engaging in acts of ‘transfer’ or ‘cleansing’, but would become a complete pariah in the international community and to many in the Jewish community abroad (some would argue that this already part of Zionist ideology). If the proposal would be widely supported by the different Arab communities in Israel (and surveys show they do mostly identify with the country), then it represents a ‘coming to terms’ with the existence of a State called Israel with a Jewish majority, and a desire for the end of belligerence. If the proposal was accepted by Israeli Arabs, then there would be strong pressure for Arab countries to accept it, and this of course, would pull the rug from under rejectionists—those who oppose Israel in any shape or form, including some elements of the western left.

Reconciliation over property claims of property claims by Palestinians has to be achieved in the future, as well Jewish claims to property due to the 1948 war (e.g. in the Old City of Jerusalem). Of course, claims of Palestinians for compensation for lost property are one of the strongest thorns in side of conflict resolution, but Adalah has suggested a legal structure to deal with this.

Thus, while the ‘Jewish community’ would lose its politically privileged position, cultural rights for self-determination of Jews (a key principle of Zionism), would not be abrogated. As an example, the Adalah document speaks of the preservation of Jewish and Arab school systems, religious and cultural institutions and so on.

As another act of reconciliation, I take the view that a brave step for Arab countries would also be to accept responsibility for what happened to their Jewish communities as acts of revenge, though in some situations (such as Iraq), it would appear to be well-nigh impossible to settle property or financial claims. This of course, would be highly confronting for both Palestinians and other Arabs, but would have significant symbolic impact.

A new bi- or multicultural (given the number of other immigrants from Asia, Africa etc.) Israel would be able to fruitfully engage economically with its neighbours, but at the same time, it would mean the end of the ‘special relationship’ with the USA, something which only began after 1973 when the country became increasingly important to US global strategy (and which doubts are now being cast—see my blog piece).

An additional reason for this change of ‘status’ is that the massive subsidies provided to Israel will, at some point, end, or be seriously reduced. The country will have to stand on its own two feet. While this may cause heartache to Diaspora Zionist organizations who would lose much face, the ontological needs of American or Australian big time Zionists, should not alone determine the status of Israel. Additionally, the power of the Jewish religious right to treat the country and the occupied territories as a terra nullius and a real estate opportunity will be severely curtailed.

The potential is for a return the kind of Zionism espoused in the 1920s by Judah Magnes, who supported “a binational state in which the two peoples will enjoy equal rights as befits the two elements shaping the country's destiny, irrespective of which of the two is numerically superior at any given time”.

Of course, this picture of the future has some enormous challenges, not just for the ‘practice’ of Zionism, and a few of these are suggested.

The Democratic constitution is the death knell for the Law of Return of 1950, and by implication, the end of the legal, rather than cultural connection, between Jews in Israel and Jews in the Diaspora. Instead, like other countries, immigration quotas would be set. Jews could have get all the tourist visas they want, but not expect dual citizenship automatically. Of course, those who believe in the Law of Return as the life-jacket for Jews, point to its importance to Soviet Jews or Falashas or what may happen in the future.

There also is the danger of a multi-party ‘confessional’ or ‘consociationalist’ society, strongly linked to guaranteed representation for ethno-religious blocs system that is inherently unstable (Lebanon, Belgium, Quebec). Thus, Adalah proposes a veto vote for Arab parties on issues affecting Arab rights. And even in South Africa in a post-apartheid era, except for a privileged few blacks and whites, society continues to be extraordinarily separate and unequal, and the ANC and its allies are shallow and hollow relics of what was there 20 years ago. If there is hostility and stereotyping between communities and the idea of mutual democracy may be too terrifying for either site.

The dissatisfaction of one group can have terrible consequences, or lead to a de-facto complete separation of groups in the society. The fear of violence and terror is probably one of the strongest reasons why many people will oppose the New Constitution, on top of an outright rejection of anything which limits Zionist (and for the other side, Palestinian nationalist) ideals. Because of militant Islam and nationalism in many parts in the world (often using Palestine as a key cause), the task will be enormous to build trust, not just by Jews, but within different Palestinian factions (Fatah-Hamas, and with Diaspora communities). This is where, should leaders such as Marwan Bargouti emerge as a ‘Nelson Mandela’ (as mooted by even some Israelis) , the opportunity should not be lost to move ahead.

George Antonius was a Jerusalem Palestinian, famous for his history of Arab Nationalist and the revolt before World War Two, in the Arab Awakening (1938). What is truly ironic is that at one time, he lived in the Shepherd’s Hotel in East Jerusalem, now subject to deep dispute. The Shepherd’s hotel controversy is at flashpoint (and subject to some blogging).

Looking at Antonius’ book recently, one passage struck me as extraordinarily prescient:

“The Zionists base their claims on the historic connection of Jewry with Palestine, which they represent as entitling the Jews to return to their ancient homeland. The connection is too well-known to need recapitulation, but what does need stressing, in view of the widespread misconceptions that prevail, is that a historic connection is not necessarily synonymous with a title to possession, more particularly when it relates to an inhabited country whose population claims, in addition to an ancient historic connection of their won, the natural rights inherent in actual possession” (p. 394-395).

In 1938, Antonius believed that the solution would be for an Arab Palestine with full and equal rights for Jewish citizens with connections to Britain. Obviously, the situation is now very different, and his solution is impossible. Rather, a binational state which respects Jewish aspirations and Arab rights may in fact, be the most practical option for the future if the two-state idea is too impossible to achieve.

Given that the past 60 or so years has been such a traumatic experience for both communities, is it in fact, the time to consider a Democratic Constitution seriously for the sake of the security of Jews in Israel, the health of its relationship with Jews abroad, and a new form of Zionism?

Larry Stillman is a member of the Australian Jewish Democratic Society Executive, but is expressing his own and not anyone else’s opinion.